The North Caucasian Diaspora In Turkey (May 1996)

The North Caucasian Diaspora In Turkey (May 1996)

By Egbert Wesselink

THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY

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The Abkhazians living in Turkey have preserved very well the customs, languages and dances carried there from Abkhazia by their ancestors. The etiquette of the Abkhazians [apswara] is strictly observed. Of late they have been asking us to send them copies of the alphabet, books, teaching manuals, films on Abkhazia, recording of songs, language-primers. In hundreds of letters sent to the homeland there resounds a passionate longing to become acquainted with the life and culture of the Abkhazians residing in the motherland, and we believe that the time will soon come when many of them, setting foot on soil of their forebears, will say: 'Greetings, our father Caucasus, greetings, our mother Apsne!'¹

1. INTRODUCTION

In 1989, when the conflict between Abkhazia and the central government of Georgia began, the Abkhaz² formed only a 17.8 per cent minority in Abkhazia.³ In August 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, with most of its ethnic Georgian members absent, declared independence. The Abkhaz nationalists took the lead in this process, supported by most other ethnically non-Georgian groups.⁴

Their demographic weakness was a major concern for the Abkhaz national movement. To secure ethnic survival, independence from Georgia and a change in the republic's ethnic balance was considered desirable. Remigration of the Abkhaz diaspora became a cherished goal of the separatist government of Abkhazia, and a source of concern for ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia.⁵

The vast majority of the North Caucasian diaspora, several millions of people, lives in Turkey and the wars in the Caucasus have strongly enhanced national feelings among them. They identify with the cause of the Abkhaz and the Chechens. When the wars broke out, meetings were held, solidarity committees were established, money was collected, and volunteers joined the separatist armed forces. These activities met with a great degree of sympathy among the Turkish public. At present, Chechen flags and portraits of Dzokhar Dudayev can be seen all over Turkey, and money is collected at virtually every bus station.⁶

There exists a great deal of speculation about the significance of the diaspora's contribution to Abkhazia and Chechnya, but the extent of their efforts needs yet to be investigated. This paper offers a short introduction to the North Caucasian diaspora in Turkey. It is based on interviews and publicly available sources. There has been no research done in Turkey and the Caucasus region, which makes it far from comprehensive.

2. SOME BASIC FACTS

2.1 Semantics

There are over 40 North Caucasian peoples. Linguistically, they can be divided into the indigenous Northwest Caucasians, North Central Caucasians, Dagestanians/Northeast Caucasians, and a variety of non-indigenous peoples. The Northwest Caucasians consist of three groups: Circassians, Ubykhs and Abkhaz-Abazinians. The Circassians are further subdivided into the western tribes of Shapsughs, Bzhedugs, Temirgoys and Abzakhs - together known as Adyghe - and the eastern Besleneys and Kabardians.⁷ The Northeast Caucasians consist of the Ingush, the Chechens, and the Dagestani peoples, of which the Avars, Dargins, and Lezgins are the most important. Ethnically unrelated to these peoples, but also regarded as North Caucasian because of their age-old presence in the region are i.a. the Kumyks and the North Central Caucasian peoples, the Karachai and Balkars, who speak Tur

In Turkey, the word "Cherkess", Russian for Circassian, is used to designate any North-Caucasian. Neither the state administration nor the average Turkish citizen usually distinguishes between the different North Caucasian peoples. The North Caucasians themselves do not object to this practice. They often use the word Circassian/Cherkess for all Northwest Caucasians and are conscious of the fact that they all share a common heritage. Circassians usually call themselves Adyghe.⁹ The identity of North Caucasians generally includes awareness of the name and precise location of their ancestors' villages.¹⁰

2.2 Population

The demographic data provided by the Turkish census do not categorize the North Caucasians separately. Turkish law reserves the status of national minority to non-Muslim peoples only. The Turkish census does include a category "mother tongue", though. Unfortunately, pressure to register as a Turkish speaker seems to have influenced the available statistics. State functionaries have allegedly falsified data in order to increase the ratio of Turkish speakers.¹¹ The 1960 census gave only 63,000 North Caucasian speakers.¹² The 1965 census found 58,339 persons speaking Circassian as their mother tongue and 55,030 as a second language.¹³^</

^{Current
estimates of the number of North Caucasians in Turkey range from one to six
million, depending on the sources used. The North Caucasian organizations
usually claim three million or more. The vast majority of them are Circassian.}¹⁴^{Estimates of the number
of Abkhaz in Turkey range from 30,000 up to 300,000.}¹⁵

^{The fact
that figures on the North Caucasian diaspora can differ widely is not only due
to bias or flawed statistics, but also to differences of perception. Many
people of North Caucasian descent have a mixed ethnic identity as a result of
assimilation and intermarriage.}¹⁶

^{2.3
Geography}

^{The North
Caucasians in Turkey originally lived in dispersed settlements, mostly in
Western and Central Anatolia. The percentage of North Caucasians that live in
rural communities has rapidly decreased over the past 25 years, due to
urbanization and emigration. Estimates by diaspora organizations suggest that
in 1995, 60 per cent of the North Caucasians in Turkey lived in cities. Outside
the three main centres Ankara, Istanbul and Samsun, there are organized
communities in Adana, Adapazari, Antalya, Ayancik, Balikesir, Bandirma,
Burhaniye, Bursa, Çorum, Denizli, Duzce, Erbaa, Eskisehir, Gaziantep, Gönem,
Izmir, Izmit, Kahramanmaras, Kars, Kayseri, Konya, Ladik, Mersin, Orhangazi,
Reyhanli, arkisla, Sincan, Sinop, Sivas, Soma, Sungurlu, Susurluk, Tufanbeyli,
and Yalova.}¹⁷

^{North
Caucasians are well represented among Turkish guest-workers in Western Europe.
Their organizations lack unity, not unlike their parent organizations in
Turkey.}¹⁸

^2.4
Language

^{Minority
languages in Turkey have been eroded by urbanization, and by the fact that
education and the mass-media are all in Turkish language only. Publishing in
another language is forbidden under Law No. 2932 of 19 November 1983.}¹⁹^{It is not uncommon for
children to be forbidden to speak a language other than Turkish at school.}²⁰

^{All
members of the diaspora speak Turkish; for most of them it is their first
language. Only in isolated rural areas have they fully preserved their own
language and cultural identity. Urbanized North Caucasians quickly adopt
Turkish language and customs and among the urbanized youth, knowledge of the language
of origin is exceptional.}²¹^{In some cases, internal
assimilation has taken place, as in the case of the Ubykh, who quickly adopted
the language of the Circassian majority around them.}²²

^{In the
North Caucasus itself the different ethnic groups have generally preserved
their own languages, with the exception of the Abkhaz. Urbanized Abkhaz have
often been Russified.}²³

^{During its
de facto independence from 1991 to 1994, Chechnya established a rich
variety of contacts with the North Caucasian diaspora, including provision of
language schools for Turkish Chechens. A Chechen-Turkish College was
established in Grozny and hundreds of Chechens enrolled in Turkish, Jordanian,
Syrian, and Egyptian universities.}²⁴

^2.5
Religion

^{Christian
Georgians and Christian Abkhaz cannot live together, but Christian Abkhaz and
Muslim Adyghe can! Nowadays, people can no longer be judged on religious
grounds. Everyone who wants to become one with the motherland can overcome the
religious problem. The motherland wants us to return to overcome the population
shortage.}²⁵

^{The
indigenous populations of the North Caucasus are Muslim, with the exception of
the Abkhaz and the Ossetians who are, with few exceptions, Christian. While
Islam is of great importance for the social life and ethnic identity of the
Northeast Caucasians, religion is a marginal social factor in North Ossetia and
in the Northwest Caucasus, including Abkhazia.}²⁶

^{The North
Caucasian diaspora is entirely Muslim, including its Abkhaz and Ossetian members.
Within the North Caucasian diaspora it is generally presumed that they were
deported from Russia because of their religion. Islam forms an integral part of
their identity and has historically been an important motive for their loyalty
to the Turkish state.}²⁷

^{It came as
a shock to members of the diaspora to find out in the late 1980s that the
Abkhaz in the homeland were Christian Orthodox, if religious at all, and that
the other Northwest Caucasian peoples, though officially Muslim, had no interest
in religious teaching. Religious radicals within the diaspora community even
proposed to cut contacts with the Abkhaz for this reason.}²⁸^{In reaction, the
Government of Abkhazia has undertaken to construct a mosque in Sukhumi to
satisfy the religious needs of members of the diaspora.}²⁹

^{3. A
SHORT HISTORY OF THE NORTH CAUCASIAN DIASPORA IN TURKEY}

^{3.1 The
Exodus}

^{After a
long and cruel war against the Russian Empire, the Northeast Caucasians were
defeated in 1858, and the Northwest Caucasians in 1864. On 14 April 1864 a
victorious Prince Mikhael met with the leaders of the Adyghe tribes in Sochi
and told them to leave the high mountains and settle in the plains. Those who
refused were ordered to leave the Russian Empire within one month, or otherwise
be considered prisoners of war. Panic followed and many listened to promises of
peace and wealth in the Ottoman Empire. All of the Ubykhs, the majority of the
Circassians, and very many Abkhaz left for the Ottoman Empire.}³⁰^{In the Northern
Caucasus, their lands were taken by Slavs, in Abkhazia by Georgians, Armenians
and Greeks. Emigration of North Caucasians even continued after the
establishment of the Bolshevik regime in the Soviet Union. The Northwest
Caucasian peoples b}

^{The North
Caucasian refugees were used by the Ottoman Government to strengthen its grip
on the empire. In Asia Minor, they were resettled in regions where the
Government had only limited authority, where Muslims formed a minority, or
where unrest had broken out. It was government policy to allow only one North
Caucasian family for each four Turkish families.}³³^{The refugees were
dispersed over the Empire for fear of their militant character and many were
brought to Syria, Palestine and the Balkans. The latter group was forced to resettle
in Asia Minor after the 1878 Berlin Treaty forbade their presence in the
European parts of the Ottoman Empire.}³⁴

^{The
emigration was a disaster for the North Caucasian peoples. Usually, they were
resettled on poor land and they often had to fight for possession of the land
that had been allocated to them. The Ubykh nation disappeared entirely. The
last Ubykh speaker, Tevfik Esenç, died in Turkey in October 1992.}³⁵^{The disappearance of
the Ubykh has made a great impression on the North Caucasians, reviving
memories of the 19th century genocide and strengthening the consequent desire
for political independence.}³⁶

^{4.
ASSIMILATION AND ORGANIZATION}

^4.1
General

^{Since the
proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1918, minorities have been subjected
to a strong turkification policy. Under the "Surname Law", minorities
are obliged to adopt Turkish names with the result that only a few North
Caucasians in Turkey still bear their ancestral names. Use of North Caucasian
languages is still actively discouraged.}³⁷

^{In rural
areas opposition to assimilation is strongest and there are hundreds of local
North Caucasian cultural centres and organizations. Here, North Caucasian
traditions are still generally respected and there is still strong pressure to marry
inside the group.}³⁸^{Half of the North
Caucasians in Turkey are believed to be fully assimilated, while at the same
time being aware of their ancestry.}³⁹^{The popular view of
ethnicity is quite realistic in Turkey. People identify their neighbours as
Cherkess, Tatars, Kurds etc. with little tension arising.}⁴⁰

^{North
Caucasians are generally respected in Turkish society. They are not victims of
prejudice, there are no complaints about discrimination against them and they
are well represented in high state functions. To name just one of the many
examples, during the 1980s, the President of the General Staff, at the time one
of the most powerful positions in the country, was an ethnic Chechen, DoZan
Güres. He regularly attended North Caucasian cultural events.}⁴¹

^{The North
Caucasian organizations in Turkey are still mainly active in the cultural
field.}⁴²^{They are subject to
numerous legal and political restrictions. The 1938 Turkish Law on Associations
does not permit associations to carry out political activity. Furthermore,
Turkish law prohibits political parties based on ethnicity. Permission must be
asked for large gatherings, while major events in Turkey are usually closely
monitored by the authorities.}⁴³

^{Many
organizations are legally insecure and can be closed down on the orders of the
local police or municipality. Those that have managed to obtain the status of
foundation (vakif) are better protected by law. A vakif must have
an educational or social purpose and possess a minimum amount of capital.}

^{There is a
wide proliferation of organizations as a result of the geographic dispersal and
ethnic division of the North Caucasian diaspora. The weakness that this
division brings about is realized, but has as yet not resulted in effective
unification or centralization. The older generation dominates the governing
bodies of the organizations. The issue of leadership is another factor that has
kept the North Caucasians divided. During meetings at the end of 1992, the
organizations in Ankara and Istanbul both demanded that the seat of any central
body must be in their own city. Another major obstacle is the abundance of
candidates for leadership.}⁴⁴

^{4.2
North Caucasian Organizations 1864-1950}

^{While most
North Caucasians settled in the country, the social and intellectual elites
opted for Constantinopel. They generally identified with the Turkish state, the
Muslim hereditary enemy of Russia, and encountered no difficulty integrating.
With the adoption of the Turkish Constitution of 1908, the North Caucasians
obtained a number of important civil rights. They played an important role in
the young republic. North Caucasian organizations flourished. The most
prominent of them was the Çerkess Ittihad ve Teavun Cemiyeti (Circassian Union
and Aid Association), 1908-1923. The main Circassian newspaper was Çerkes
Yardimlasma DerneZi.}⁴⁵

^{The
proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1918 brought a sharp regression to
the social and political life of the North Caucasians, partially due to the
Circass Ethem event. Circass Ethem was a celebrated army officer, an ethnic
œhapsugh from Balikesir, who became a national hero during the First World War
and played an important role in the suppression of the Bolu, Dünzce and Yozgat
riots of 1919. He wielded considerable military power through his units, which
showed great personal loyalty to him. After the war he ran into political
difficulties with the Governor of Yozgat and eventually refused to acknowledge
the authority of Kemal Atatürk. He was officially declared a traitor in 1920
and fled to Greece. His case was used by the Government of Turkey to discredit
North Caucasians.}⁴⁶^{A number of villages in
Balikesir were cleared of North Caucasians and the}

^{In 1923 it
became a official Government policy to promote Turkish identity and a sense of
national unity among the ethnically heterogenous population. As a result, most
North Caucasian organizations were abolished, their schools were closed and
their publications were prohibited. Only organizations stating that they
represented North Caucasian Turks were allowed to continue to operate. They
were strongly anti-communist and supported the idea of Turkey as the new
homeland.}⁴⁸

^{After the
Second World War, the restrictions on cultural activities were slowly modified.
In the early 1950s there were over 30 registered North Caucasian associations,
where North Caucasian history, culture, language, dance and customs were taught
to the younger generation. A North Caucasian intelligentsia was emerging, keen
on its ethnic identity.}

^{4.3
North Caucasian Organizations 1950-1989}

^{The
organizations that came to the fore in the 1950s tried to unify the North
Caucasian peoples in Turkey in an effort to counter assimilation tendencies.
This failed because of the heterogeneity of the North Caucasian peoples and
because it contradicted the state's policy to build a Turkish identity for all
citizens.}⁴⁹

^{Gradually,
political opinion within the North Caucasian diaspora started mirroring the
political divisions within Turkish society. During the late 1960s, a leftist,
pro-Arab and anti-Western current emerged that pointed to the fact that under
communism, the North Caucasians were allowed a degree of self-rule and that
they could study their own history and languages. They rejected the concept of
Turkey as the new homeland and revived the repatriation ideal. They criticized
the cultural and political pressures that North Caucasians faced in Turkey and
praised the practice of local self rule and the official support for North
Caucasian culture in the Soviet Union.}⁵⁰

^{The young
radicals failed to impress the assimilated urban groups or the rural majority
and many North Caucasians continued to call themselves Turks rather than
Circassians. Circulation of the publications of the urban elite was limited and
most village dwellers remained only dimly aware of developments in the North
Caucasus.}⁵¹^{But among the growing
North Caucasian communities in the cities their ideas found numerous followers.
The leftist tradition is still strong in the cities. In their publications, the
downfall of the Soviet Union is depicted as an American triumph, and the
ensuing Caucasian wars as consequences of the introduction of capitalism.}⁵²

^{The slow
democratization process in Turkey which had started in the 1960s opened the way
for a renaissance of North Caucasian organizations. The associations often had
a small library, organized festivities and lectures, and housed a folklore
dance group.}⁵³^{Usually they had very
limited financial means and lacked any political programme.}⁵⁴

^{Like all
of the civic society in Turkey, all North Caucasian organizations were closed
down after the military coup of 1980. They re-emerged in the late 1980s. By
then, Islamist ideas added new divisions to the North Caucasian diaspora,
although efforts to establish Islamist North Caucasian organizations have so
far been unsuccessful. However, there exists an Islamist North Caucasian
periodical which is published in Kayseri.}⁵⁵

^{4.4
North Caucasian Organizations 1989-1996}

^{Until the
late 1980s, the activities of North Caucasian organizations had essentially
been aimed at fostering ethnic cohesion and countering turkification.}⁵⁶^{The perestroïka
policy of the Soviet Union made it possible for the diaspora to visit the land
of their ancestors and to invite scholars and political activists from the
North Caucasus. They toured to lecture on history and language and generated
great enthusiasm for the national cause in the homeland.}⁵⁷^{Periodicals in Turkey
started to publish contributions by intellectuals from the North Caucasus. In
1991 a Turkish-Adyghe dictionary was published in Maikop, Adyghea.}⁵⁸^</

^{Links were
established between cities in the North Caucasus and Turkish cities with
sizeable North Caucasian populations.}⁵⁹^{Previously, the smaller
North Caucasian ethnic groups like the Abkhaz, the Dagestanis, the Karachai,
the Balkars and the Chechens had usually joined the larger Circassian
organizations, but now each ethnic group started to interact with the
corresponding republic. Therefore a great number of local new organizations
were established along ethnic lines.}⁶⁰^{Groups of young
Caucasians started to proclaim their non-Turkic identity and protested loudly
against decades of national suppression in Russia and in Turkey. They objected
to the non-political and careful attitude of the elder generation.}

^{One of
the turning points in the North Caucasian revival was the 1989 Kafkas Kültür
DerneZi congress in Ankara to commemorate the 125th anniversary of the 1864 exodus.
A large number of politicians and activists from outside Turkey participated.
Contacts were established which boosted the level of activity and led to many
institutionalized links between the diaspora and the North Caucasus.}⁶³

^{In
November 1987 a local coordinating body had been established in Ankara, the
Kafkas Kültür DerneZi.}⁶⁴^{The wish to streamline
efforts in support of the Abkhazian and Chechen separatist movements led to
attempts to unite the diaspora. On 18 October 1990, Kafkas Kültür DerneZi
became a coordinating body for eleven Northwest Caucasian organizations. One of
its purposes was to stimulate remigration through the establishment of contacts
with republics in the North Caucasus and assistance to returnees.}⁶⁵^{A further expansion
took place in October 1992 in Ankara, when a meeting organized by Kafkas Kültür
DerneZi of 20 North Caucasian associations established a federative body, the
Kafkas DerneZi (Kaf-Der), with 23 branches, which replaced the Kafka}

^{To the
ethnic and regional diversity of the diaspora is at present added the division
between groups that favour orientation towards Turkey and those who focus on
developments in the North Caucasus. On 6 June 1992, a revolution took place
within the Ankara branch of Kafkas DerneZi. For the first time there were
competing candidates for the election of the association's governing body. The
opposition advocated closer cooperation with the Turkish authorities, but was
defeated by the group that wanted greater focus on developments in the North
Caucasus, an active repatriation policy and establishment of relations with the
North Caucasian diaspora outside Turkey.}⁶⁸

^{Kaf-Der
is sometimes at odds with the richer Birlesik Kafkaseyi Konseyi, the two
Dostluk Klubü DerneZi organizations and œamil EZitim ve Kültür Vakfi. The
latter organizations are dominated by businessmen and do not actively oppose
assimilation. They believe that the North Caucasian cause is best defended
through loyalty to Turkey, while within the Kaf-Der it is widely believed that
Turkish ethnic chauvinism, being official state policy, constitutes a major
problem for the North Caucasians, and that Turkey, because of its friendly
relations with Georgia and Russia, is partly responsible for an on-going
genocidal war on Abkhazians and Chechens.}⁶⁹^{Kaf-Der strongly
supports the struggle for independence of Abkhazia and Chechnya.}⁷⁰^{Officially, K}

^{The
divisions within the North Caucasian community are not only a source of
weakness, but also a sign of vitality. Encouraged by massive sympathy among the
Turkish public for the Chechen resistance against Russia, the diaspora
organizations have rediscovered their raison d'être and they attract
increasing numbers of assimilated North Caucasians who used to show little
interest in the North Caucasus. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find
reliable information about current membership of North Caucasian organizations.}

^{The
renaissance of the ethnic identity of the North Caucasians in Turkey is not
reflected in a campaign for minority rights. Some radicals have started
demanding Caucasian language education and activists have started using their
original family names, but they did not win over any of the major
organizations.}⁷³

^{4.5 The
International Dimension}

^{The
North Caucasian communities in the Middle East are relatively strong. In Jordan
there is a Circassian community of about 95,000, mostly Kabardian and Adyghe,
but also including about 15,000 Chechens. In Syria, the Circassian community
counts over 110,000. There is also a small Circassian community in Israel,
mostly ethnically Shapsugh, and a community of 1,500 in Iraq. During the war
with Iran in the 1980s, the Iraqi Army counted eight Chechen generals among its
ranks.}⁷⁴^{Only Jordan and Israel
permit Circassian language schools. In all these countries the Circassians are
relatively well represented among the professional military and in the public
service. They generally combine identification with the fate of their peoples
in the North Caucasus with loyalty to their country of residence.}⁷⁶^{In the Jordanian
parliament, there are three seats reserved for North Caucasians, two for
Circassians and one for a Chechen. The current Chechen deputy is considered to
be aligned with the pro-Moscow government in Grozny, while one of the
Circassians, Mrs. Tujan Feisal, has been appointed spokeswoman for Dudayev. She
organises support meetings for Chechnya and coordinates relief efforts.}⁷⁷

^{The
breaking up of the Soviet Union led to the establishment of an international
North Caucasian body. On 19-20 May 1991, the Kafkas Kültür Dernegi represented
the Circassian and Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey at the All-Circassian Congress in
Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria. During the congress, the All-Circassian World
Federation was founded, later to be called the International Adyghe and Abkhaz
Federation.}⁷⁸^{At present the
Federation, of which Kaf-Der is a member, is based in Maikop, Adyghea. The
purpose of the organization is to foster solidarity among Circassians of the
diaspora and in the mother country and to assist in remigration.}⁷⁹^{All the major
organizations of the Circassian diaspora are members of the Association. Its
first president, Yu}

^{5. THE
NORTH CAUCASIAN DIASPORA AND THE WARS IN ABKHAZIA AND CHECHNYA}

^{The wars in the Caucasus
have brought a reawakening of our national identity, but also new anxieties:
feelings of helplessness and weakness because we cannot influence these wars
that take place within the borders of other states. [Süleyman Yançatarol].}⁸¹

^{5.1 The
War in Abkhazia}

^{The
demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was preceded by the emergence of
vicious forms of national chauvinism. As early as 1988, the leading Georgian
nationalist Zviad Gamsachurdia used alleged discrimination against Georgians in
Abkhazia as a focus of his political campaign. He argued that the Abkhaz
national identity was an artificial construction, an instrument in the hands of
Russian imperialism. Many Abkhazians regarded the breaking apart of the Soviet
Union as a chance to undo what they regarded as the annexation of Abkhazia by
the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia in 1931. Tension between separatists
and Georgian nationalists escalated, and in July 1989 twenty people died during
inter-ethnic clashes in the capital of Abkhazia, Sukhumi.}⁸²

^{On 28
October 1989, Zviad Gamsachurdia became the leader of Georgia. On 9 March 1990,
Georgian independence was declared. The new Government of Georgia adopted a
series of measures that minorities considered serious infringements of their
rights.}⁸³^{In August 1990, the
Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, with its ethnic Georgian
members absent, declared national sovereignty. From that moment on, Abkhazia
acted as an independent country.}⁸⁴

^{The
Government of Abkhazia devoted much attention to its relations with other North
Caucasian peoples. They organized cultural manifestations that generated great
enthusiasm among North Caucasian peoples in Russia and in the diaspora.}⁸⁵^{The foreign policy of
Abkhazia was based on friendship with the Soviet Union, later the Russian
Federation, and the bolstering of the Abkhazian nationality. The latter was to
be achieved i.a. by mobilizing the potential of the Abkhaz diaspora.}⁸⁶

^{On 14
August 1992 Georgian troops invaded Abkhazia. Tens of thousands of Abkhaz,
Russians, Armenians and Greeks had to flee before the ill-disciplined Georgian
forces. Initially, the Georgians were victorious, but after their failure to
capture Gagra in early September 1992, the tide turned. Irregular troops from
the North Caucasus came to the aid of the separatists. The Russian army
allegedly helped Abkhazia with weapons, air support and occasional military
operations. The Georgian forces were ousted from Abkhazia in September 1993.
The Abkhazian advance led to a massive exodus of ethnic Georgians from
Abkhazia. Both parties to the conflict have been accused of systematic
violation of human rights.}⁸⁷

^{The
Abkhaz desire for independence was partly driven by fear of extinction. As a
result of the 19th century exodus and Russian and Georgian migration politics,
the proportion of Abkhaz in Abkhazia had dropped from almost 100 per cent in
1864 to 18 only per cent in 1989.}⁸⁸

^{The
invasion by Georgian forces of Abkhazia in August 1991 and their criminal
behaviour created shockwaves among the North Caucasian communities in Turkey.
They fully identified with the separatist side. Reports about deliberate
destruction by Georgian forces of all major archives, scientific institutes,
libraries, museums and theatres in Abkhazia, of ethnic cleansing, looting, rape
and wanton destruction caused acute fear of another genocide.}⁸⁹

^{5.2 The
Abkhazian Republic and the North Caucasian Diaspora}

^{During
the mid-1970s, repatriation of members of the diaspora to the North Caucasus
became possible. The legal procedure for repatriation was regulated by the laws
of the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation. Members of the North
Caucasian diaspora were given Russian citizenship relatively quickly, even
though there existed no special legislation for them. Georgia effectively
opposed all repatriation of Abkhaz.}⁹⁰

^{Abkhaz
nationalists considered the precarious demographic situation in Abkhazia a
threat to their national survival and hoped for the return of the diaspora.
Repatriation of the diaspora became a cornerstone of Abkhazian policy since the
de facto self rule in 1990 and the separatist Government of Abkhazia
regards the members of the diaspora as refugees from the time of the Russian
conquest, with the right to repatriation and Abkhazian citizenship. The
Government of Georgia is strongly opposed to this policy.}⁹¹

^{In 1991
a decree was issued, giving returnees wide-ranging privileges in privatization
and in entrepreneurial activities. In 1992, the Abkhazian Presidential Commission
on Co-Nationals was established to facilitate remigration, headed by the
returnee Chkotua Otkai.}⁹²^{In addition, a number
of non-governmental organizations were established to assist returnees, notably
Apsadgil and the Demographic Fund. With financial help from organizations in
Turkey, three specialized educational institutes have been established in
Abkhazia, where returnees teach.}⁹³^{It was decided to build
a mosque in Sukhumi and a huge monument stretching into the Black Sea,
symbolizing the deportations of the 1860s and the hoped-for return of the
diaspora.}

^{5.3 The
North Caucasian Diaspora and the War in Abkhazia}

^{On 16
August 1992, demonstrations were held in Istanbul and Ankara against the
invasion of Abkhazia and the passive attitude of the Government of Turkey.
Thousands of North Caucasians went into the streets, impressing not only the
Turkish public, but also themselves. The North Caucasians suddenly had become a
political factor in Turkey and Kaf-Der started an active lobbying policy that
focussed on the governments of Turkey and the Russian Federation.}⁹⁶

^{New
organizations supporting the Abkhazian cause proliferated. The most important
of these, the Kafkas-Abkhaz Dayanisma Komitesi, was founded in August 1992 by
Abkhazians who had thus far taken part in larger, Circassian dominated,
organizations. The Kafkas-Abkhaz Dayanisma Komitesi wanted the Circassian
diaspora to engage in building a new Abkhazia and established close contacts
with the Government of Abkhazia. The Committee was radical and aroused a lot of
enthusiasm, notably among the youth. Abkhaz solidarity committees emerged among
the North Caucasian diaspora outside Turkey as well. The Committee was meant to
serve as a coordinating body for the many local initiatives, but did not fully
achieve this aim. It did engage in lobbying activities, but never developed
into an effective political body.}

^{On 22
August 1992, a joint statement of all North Caucasian organizations in Turkey
was published, denouncing the Georgian invasion.}⁹⁷^{For the first time the
diaspora felt it had a common cause. The response to the many appeals for money
and goods to support Abkhazia was massive. Hundreds of young men volunteered to
fight in Abkhazia, and many more planned to remigrate to Abkhazia to regain the
ancestral lands. Nolens volens, cultural organizations gained political
meaning.}⁹⁸^{The war also boosted
the interaction between North Caucasian communities in Turkey, Syria, Jordan,
Germany, the United States and the member states of the Commonwealth of
Independent States.}¹⁰⁰^{This and similar
statements have generated speculation about the involvement of the diaspora in
the war in Abkhazia and later also in Chechnya. When the war in Chechnya broke
out, Yuri Kalmykov resigned as Russian Minister of Justice. The International
Adyghe and Abkhaz Federation lost the tacit support it had received from
Russian government circles before. Its third international conference which was
planned in Sukhumi in 1995 was cancelled because of the Russian blockade of
Abkhazia.}^<SUP

^{On 27
November 1992, the Birlesik Kafkasya Konseyi Dernegi was established at the
initiative of the Kafkas-Abkhaz Dayanisma Komitesi. The Konseyi included
businessmen who offered to coordinate the assistance given to the Abkhazian Republic
and to assist in the development of business relations between Turkey and
Abkhazia.}¹⁰²

^{When
Georgia invaded Abkhazia on 14 August 1992, the international community,
including Turkey, generally regarded the conflict as an internal affair of
Georgia. Initially, the outburst of North Caucasian solidarity was met with
unease by the Turkish authorities. A planned 6 September 1992 meeting of the
diaspora in Istanbul was prohibited by the Vice-Governor of the province, and
there were complaints that the media were subjected to pressure to ignore the
pro-Abkhazian activities of the diaspora.}¹⁰³^{The fact that the
Government of Turkey ignored what the diaspora considered an attempt to destroy
the Abkhaz people, created much anger. The North Caucasians had always been
loyal to the Turkish state, and the radicals saw the Turkish passivity as a
betrayal of this loyalty.}¹⁰⁵^{The membership of the
Political Commission of the Committee includes Abüllatif œener, member of
parliament for the Refah Partisi, and Rauf Bozkurt, president of Kaf-Der. The
committee serves as a coordinating body for similar organizations outside
Turkey. It supports t}

^{The
Kafkas-ÇeÇen Dayanisma Komitesi lobbies in favour of the Chechen struggle for
independence, both at the national and the international level. It is actively
engaged in mobilizing pressure on the Turkish authorities to make them take a
tough stand against Russian policies in Chechnya.}¹⁰⁷^{The outspoken political
character of the committee represents a sharp break with the traditional
activities of diaspora organizations.}¹⁰⁸

^{There
is no reliable information on the number of diaspora volunteers that have
joined the war in Chechnya, but their number is probably insignificant. The
Kafkas-ÇeÇen Dayanisma Komitesi claims that there are 50 Turkish citizens
fighting on the Chechen side of the conflict, including both North Caucasians
and ethnic Turks.}¹⁰⁹^{The Kaf-Der Bülten in
1995 mentioned only one North Caucasian from Turkey who had died in Chechnya,
Hüseyin Gülseren.}¹¹⁰^{There are indications
that members of the North Caucasian diaspora in Turkey have been discouraged
from participating in the war in Chechnya because of the implications for
Turkey's relations with the separatist Government of Chechnya and because so
few of them can speak sufficient Chechen or Russi}

^{According
to Pravda on 4 March 1996, two diaspora organizations, the Committee for
Cooperation with Chechnya and the Committee for Cooperation with the Peoples of
the Caucasus, have become conduits for financial support and arms for the
regime of Dzhokar Dudayev. Pravda claimed that between January and April
1995, nearly US$ 700,000 was brought to Chechnya through these channels with
assistance from Turkish special agencies.}¹¹²^{This amount does not
seem to be an exaggeration.}¹¹³

^{The Pravda
report further stated:}

^{Turkey played a major
role in securing weapons for the Chechen army. The first shipment of weapons
and ammunition arrived from Turkey on trucks in November 1991, under the guise
of humanitarian aid. The issue is that after German unification, Turkey,
through NATO channels, received large quantities of formerly Soviet arms from
storehouses in the German Democratic Republic. A significant portion of them
was easily transported to Chechnya through Azerbaijan.}¹¹⁴

^{These
claims have never been substantiated.}

^{On 17
January 1996, Tatyana Samolis, press secretary to the Russian Federal Foreign
Intelligence service, said during a press conference: "The diaspora there
[in Turkey] is very active. In our view it goes beyond the bounds of simply
humanitarian aid." Grigory Karasin, the director of the information
directorate of the Russian Foreign Ministry added at the same occasion:
"We informed the Turkish side on more than one occasion about dangerous,
anti-Russian actions by extremist circles of the Chechen diaspora and by
Dudayev's commissars on the territory of Turkey."}¹¹⁵

^{In
January 1996, the Russian Government officially complained to the Government of
Turkey that it allowed Chechens a free hand and failed to prevent members of
the North Caucasian diaspora from training and sending forces to fight in
Chechnya.}¹¹⁶

^{5.5 The
January 1996 Black Sea Hostage Taking}

^{On 16
January 1996, the ferry Avrasya, which was due to leave Trabzon port for Sochi
in Russia, was hijacked by gunmen who demanded the end of the siege in
Pervomayskoye.}¹¹⁷^{Three of the five
hijackers, including the leader, Mohammed Tocsan, were Turkish citizens of the
North Caucasian diaspora. In Turkey, reports circulated that the hijackers were
linked to the extreme rightwing organization, Milly Hariket Partise (better
known as Grey Wolves), and Muslim fundamentalist organizations like Nizam-i
Alem Ocaklari and the Hezbollah. On 19 January 1996, the Governor of Trabzon,
Alladin Yüksel, accused North Caucasian groups of maintaining close relations
with the Hezbollah.}¹¹⁸^{On 20 January 1996, an
unspecified State Prosecutor in Dünzce repea}

^{Mohammed
Tocsan, a veteran of the wars in Abkhazia and Chechnya, claimed that he belonged
to the North Caucasian Union of Cherkessian and Abkhaz Turks.}¹²¹^{This was denied by
North Caucasian organizations in Turkey, who quickly distanced themselves from
the hijackers, calling them "a few adventurous students, with whom we have
no relations",}¹²²^{while expressing
sympathy for their goals. All indications point to an isolated action by a
group of people who were unusually closely connected with the fighting in
Chechnya.}

^{There
was great relief among diaspora organizations when the hijacking ended without
bloodshed. The Turkish press generally praised the restraint shown by both the
hijackers and the Turkish authorities, and expressed much understanding for the
hijackers' motives.}¹²³

^{5.6
Repatriation}

^{The guesses one
sometimes hears about hundreds of thousands of Circassians wanting to return to
the Northwest Caucasus are unrealistic. Certainly, some will return, but
numbers will only become significant when there is a prosperous and stable
situation in the area.... One should not forget that many Circassians in the
diaspora are loyal and contented citizens of their respective country, who
often like to boast about their Circassian descent, but will not put their
words into practice, once this becomes feasible." [Rieks Smeets]}¹²⁴

^{During
the late 1960s, repatriation became a cherished ideal among the North Caucasian
diaspora. After contacts had been re-established with the North Caucasus during
the late 1980s, the idea received much enthusiasm in Turkey and the support
from republics in the North Caucasus. Nevertheless, the repatriation movement
never gained momentum. The number of returnees are counted in the hundreds
rather than the thousands. "The return movement is only significant in the
imagination of Cossacks and Georgians, who are afraid that we will take back
our land."}¹²⁵^{A number of delegations
visited the North Caucasus around 1990 to study prospects for repatriation
programmes. The visitors were disappointed with the low standard of living in
the North Caucasus. Another problem was the fact that the Abkhaz in Abkhazia
appeared to be Christians and that the other North West C}

^{Responding
to an invitation by the Government of Abkhazia, a large delegation of the
diaspora paid a visit to Abkhazia on 6 July 1992. They were informed about the
economic prospects of Abkhazia and about recent measures to encourage mass
return, including the allocation of land, notably in the Ochamchira area.}¹²⁷^{The ambitious programme
that was meant to result from this trip was frustrated by the outbreak of the
war.}

^{Nevertheless,
hundreds of people have returned to the North Caucasus. Remigration to Abkhazia
started in 1989. According to Chkotua Otkai, it continued until the Russian
blockade of Abkhazia in 1993.}¹²⁸^{Most people who did
remigrate were young men, who planned to create a basis for existence before
marrying or having their family come over. When the war came, they either
joined the Abkhazian army or returned to Turkey.}¹²⁹

^{It is
not unusual to come across a members of the diaspora in the North Caucasus.
They are not only returnees, but often businessmen, students or participants in
exchange programmes who spend a period in the country of origin of their
ancestors. The Abkhaz State University of Sukhumi offers scholarships for students
from Turkey, and so do the universities of Maikop (Adyghea) and Nalchik
(Kabardino-Balkaria).}¹³⁰

^{In the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, the Georgian side accuses Abkhazia of encouraging
the settlement of large numbers of North Caucasians, including members of the
diaspora, in areas such as Gali region.}¹³¹^{There are no impartial
sources of information on this issue, nor any reliable figures.}¹³²^{According to Professor
Levan Alexidze, remigration to Abkhazia started as early as 1989, when 80 Abkhaz
of Syrian nationality settled in Abkhazia.}¹³³^{In Georgia, the opinion
can be heard that power in Abkhazia is no longer in the hands of native
Abkhazians, but North Caucasians, including members of the diaspora.According
to Abkhazian sources, in 1992 an estimated 150 North Caucasians went from
Turkey to fight in Abkhazia. Three quarters of them are believed to have been
of Abkhaz descent.}¹³⁵^{Allegedly, a comparable
number of North Caucasians from Jordan and Syria volunteered. Some of these
people have remained in Abkhazia after the war.}¹³⁶^{Unofficial groups in
Syria and Jordan organized the recruitment of volunteers. There have been
volunteers killed in action and taken prisoner.}¹³⁷^{"The Abkhazian
authorities acknowledged that [during the war] they had received significant
financial assistance from the Abkhaz diaspora, in ad}

^6.
PROSPECTS

^{The
resurgence of Caucasian national feelings has been called the
"resurrection of the virtually comatose",}¹³⁹^{but should perhaps
rather be termed the "coming out" of a group of ethnic minorities in
Turkey. The North Caucasian organizations in Turkey still lack unity,
follow-through, funding and cadre, but the wars in the Caucasus have
enourmously increased their motivation and the scope of their activities. The
proliferation and expansion of local organizations has created awareness of the
necessity to join forces. The organizations' involvement in the wars in the
North Caucasus is officially limited to humanitarian and financial assistance.
There are no reasons to believe that they are also actively involved in
military matters on a significant scale.}

^{Even
though the return ideal is still very much alive, only a small group of highly
motivated individuals have actually taken the step to settle in the North
Caucasus. The members of the diaspora are generally too well integrated in
Turkish society for any massive return movement to be likely, even if the
situation in the North Caucasus should dramatically improve. Integration has
gone so far that some linguists have expressed serious doubt whether North
Caucasian languages have any real future at all in Turkey, Syria or Jordan.}¹⁴⁰^{The successful
integration also forms a major obstacle to the development of North Caucasian
nationalism in Turkey.}

^{The
North Caucasians do have the potential to play a role in future Turkish
politics. In this respect, the development of the Kafkas-ÇeÇen Dayanisma
Komitesi is noteworthy. It is well rooted in major political parties and
actively lobbies for changes in Turkish foreign policy. It accepts the support
of nationalist and religious parties, who try to capitalize on the overwhelming
support for the Chechen cause among the Turkish population. This support also
forms a source of concern. Identification with right-wing and religious groups
could result in internal division and political marginalization; but on the
other hand, the material and moral support is quite welcome.}¹⁴¹

^{7.
BIBLIOGRAPHY}

^{Alexidze,
Levan, Professor and Deputy Dean of the University of Tbilisi and President of
the Georgian State Committee on Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide in Abkhazia.
Personal interview, Tbilisi, 10 December 1993.}

^{Andrews,
Peter Alford. Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey. Wiesbaden: Dr
Ludwig Reich Verlag, 1989.}

^{Asbarez
on Line}^{[Glendale]. 4 March 1996, quoting Pravda [Moscow]. 4
March 1996.}

^{Baydilli,
Zehai, Leader of the Circassian Cultural Organization in the Netherlands,
affiliated with Kafkas DerneZi. Telephone interviews, 1 February, 19 March
1996, 8 and 10 April 1996.}

^{BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts}^{[London]. "'Caucasian Turks' Hijack
Ferry in Turkish Port Trabzon". 18 January 1996, quoting TRT TV Ankara.
16 January 1996.}

^{BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts}^{[London]. "Trabzon Hijackers State
their Case on Turkish TV". 18 January 1996, quoting Istanbul Kanal-D
Television [Istanbul]. 17 January 1996.}

^{BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts}^{[London]. "Russia Warned Turkey of
Chechen Activity, Say Intelligence and Foreign Ministry Officials". 19
January 1996, quoting NTV [Moscow]. 17 January 1996.}

^{Bezanis,
Lowell. "Soviet Muslim Emigrés in the Republic of Turkey". Central
Asian Survey. Vol. 13, No. 1 (1994). Pp. 59-177.}

^{Birch,
Julian. "The Georgian/South Ossetian Territorial and Boundary
Dispute" in John F.R. Wright, Susan Goldenberg, Richard Schofield (eds.). Transcaucasian
Boundaries. London: University College London Press, 1996. Pp. 151-189.}

^{Bozkurt,
Rauf, President of Kafkas DerneZi, Ankara. Telephone interview, 9 February
1996.}

^{Central
Asian Survey}^{. "Council of the Federation, Parliament of
the Russian Federation: Deputy, State Duma 1993-1995". Vol. 15, No. 1
(1996). Pp. 119-20.}

^{Chirikba,
Viacheslav A., Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Abkhazia. Personal
interviews, Leiden, 28 December 1995, 16 and 20 January 1996; letter to the
author, Leiden, 6 February 1996}

^{Colarusso,
John. "Abkhazia". Paper presented at the Conference on the
Contemporary North Caucasus. School of Oriental and African Studies. University
of London. 22-23 April 1993.}

^{Çorlu,
Janet Mayragül. Circassians in Istanbul. Istanbul: Nart Yayincilik,
1993.}

^Cumhuriyet^{[Ankara].
"Savaslar Sona Ermeli". 18 January 1996.}

^Cumhuriyet^{[Ankara].
"Baskinda Hizbullah Kuskusu". 19 January 1996.}

^Cumhuriyet^{[Ankara]. "Sorguya
Alinmali". 20 January 1996.}

^Cumhuriyet^{[Ankara].
"Eylemciler, Sorguya Alinmali". 20 January 1996.}

^{David,
Bishop of Sukhumi. Personal interview, Tbilisi, 26 July 1991.}

^{Furat,
Kenan, University of Utrecht. Personal interview, Utrecht, 2 February 1996.}

^{Golz,
Thomas. Independent researcher on the Caucasus Region. Electronic communica}